

U.S.S. CAIMAN (SS323)  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, Calif.

SS323:A16-6  
Ser: 022-52

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

4 June 1952

SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander Submarine Group, Naval Forces, Far East  
(2) Commander Naval Forces, Far East  
(3) Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet  
(4) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: USS CAIMAN (SS 323); Report of First War Patrol

Ref: (a) USF 9, para 501  
(b) OpNav Inst 3480.4  
(c) ComSubPac Inst 3480.1B  
(d) ComSubGrpNavFE OpOrd No. 7-52  
(e) ComSubGrpNavFE Order No. 10  
(f) CinCPacFlt Inst 03820.1  
(g) ComSubPac Inst 03150.1

Encl: (1) Subject report  
(2) Track charts and summary overlays  
(3) One (1) set 35 mm negatives (total 7) and five (5) sets  
prints (total 35)  
(4) (30) Five (5) reels tape recordings

1. In accordance with references (a) through (f) enclosures (1) and (2) are submitted herewith. Photographic copies of VLF reception chart and radar-scope photographs, described in section (m) of enclosure (1), are submitted herewith as enclosure (3). Tape recordings of Soviet voice broadcasts and ship contacts' sonar signatures are submitted under separate cover as enclosure (4). ECM data, section (u) of enclosure (1), is submitted separately under a higher security classification. Intelligence photographs and negatives are submitted separately in accordance with reference (g). Special cold weather information is reported directly to ComSubPac.

2. The commanding officer invites attention to the following:

- a. The effective radar coverage of an area of over 20,000 square miles on two occasions (Encl. (3) and Encl (1), section (b), p. 10 and p. 13).
- b. The 12 fathom shoal uncharted on H.C. 2723 (Encl (1), section (e), p. 20).
- c. The excessive condensation present in the After Torpedo Room throughout the patrol (Encl (3), section (p), p. 41).

J. E. BENNETT

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG USS GAIMAN conf ltr S6323:A16-6 ser 022-52 of  
4 Jun 1952

From: Commander Submarine Group, Naval Forces, Far East  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander Naval Forces, Far East  
(2) Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet  
(3) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Sub: USS GAIMAN (S6323); report of first war patrol

1. Forwarded.
2. This was a well-conducted reconnaissance patrol of thirty six days duration. Thirty days were spent on station, twenty-six of which were in Joint Zone V and four in Joint Zone VI. The decision to spend the major part of the patrol in area V is concurred in, due to the existing traffic pattern, area limitations imposed on the submarine, and the heavy volume of fishing craft in Joint Zone VI. It is considered that area coverage was excellent, resulting in a large number of ship contacts. The meticulous detail and thoroughness with which data was recorded, patrol report and enclosures prepared, are noteworthy.
3. Traffic was heavy through the patrol areas as is expected this time of year. Of the total of 93 ship contacts, eleven were positively identified by reading name on the bow, and a total of thirty one were photographed. Poor visibility and/or impossibility of closing precluded photographing of remaining contacts. It is to be noted that the Executive Officer made a study of Russian letters prior to start of patrol which assisted in identification. The New CINCPAC Recognition Manual, SIG OPE and Booklet of Photographs supplied by ComNavFE were also very helpful.
4. Sound conditions were variable and unpredictable at times. Turn counts were accurately taken and recorded where possible. The cautious use of radar by the GAIMAN throughout the patrol is concurred in. The phenomenal radar performance as experienced on this patrol on several occasions is to be expected. Such extreme dust conditions, when known to exist, should greatly influence the judicious use of submarine radar.
5. The excellent material performance, both engineering and electronic, is indicative of a well-organized, preventative maintenance program. The few casualties experienced were well handled while on patrol, and did not adversely affect the results of the mission. The GAIMAN returned in a clean, shipsshape condition, and with high morale.
6. Special comment is made on the following:
  - a. Transit of Tsugaru Strait was made during daylight enroute to area and as result GAIMAN was probably sighted numerous times. However, on return from patrol, permission was obtained to have transit made on surface during darkness. As a result GAIMAN made the passage undetected. Future submarines transiting Tsugaru Strait, will do so during darkness unless otherwise directed.

b. The failure of the CAHMAN to make sensor contact on the Russian ship, "KAPITAN SMIRNOV", making 10 knots, range 800 yards on 7 May is difficult to explain since submarine was hovering at depth of 100 feet in an ultra quiet condition. Water was isothermal. (Page 4, encl 1).

c. The lack of fishing craft in the northern part of Joint Zone V is noted, whereas CAHMAN was continuously hampered by their movements in Joint Zone VI.

d. The transiting of La Perouse Strait each way undetected is noted. Decision to take advantage of weather and visibility conditions was sound.

e. The VLF signals picked up on 24 May and again on 26 May (pages 13 and 15, encl 1) have been verified as coming from NDT, Tokyo. Testing was in progress at the times mentioned. It is noted that CAHMAN was able to copy signal at 105 foot keel depth.

f. The few patrol craft sighted during this patrol are to be expected. Their movements were not of such a nature as to hamper the submarine's mission. However, the latter must make every effort to remain undetected, as was done by the CAHMAN.

g. Navigational Aids (Page 19). The navigational shoal spot mentioned was not verified as to its location by the CAHMAN.

h. Health, Food, Habitability (Page 40). With long periods of submerged operations (average 17 hours daily), and considering that submarine was operating most of the time at "patrol quiet", humidity conditions became a problem. More air circulation in the after torpedo room would probably have proved a partial solution. Also insulation over the after tank tops might decrease the "sweating" problem.

i. Personnel (Page 41). The recommendation concerning the need for two additional watch standers for a combat patrol is concurred in.

j. Remarks (Pages 42 and 43). Procedures used in the conduct of this patrol are considered sound. The recommendation concerning an effective recoilless rifle allowance is concurred in as an emergency defensive weapon only. The additional stowage space required would not be justified except when special missions dictated their need.

7. The thorough planning and execution of this patrol left nothing to be desired. The Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the CAHMAN are commended on the highly successful completion of their mission, in which much valuable information was obtained.

P. E. SUILLERS

Copy to:  
CO USS CAHMAN (SS323)

2 JUL 1952

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SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO, USS CATMAN (SS-323) conf ltr A16-6 ser 022-52  
of 4 June 1952

From: Commander Naval Forces, Far East  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet  
(2) Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: USS CATMAN (SS-323); report of First War Patrol

1. Forwarded.
2. Commander Naval Forces, Far East agrees with the identifications made by USS CATMAN, with the following exceptions:

<u>CONTACT NO.</u>	<u>CATMAN IDENTIFICATION</u>	<u>COMNAVFET IDENTIFICATION</u>
4	TSTOLKOVSKY	YOJENA OSIPENKO
27	KURA	KALACHATKA
30	URAL	COCOL
57	GENERAL CHEREMAKHOVSKY	Unidentified
59	MAXIM GORKI Class	U/I KORSAKOV Class
78	COOPERATELLA or SMOJNY	Possibly SMOJNY
86	Naval Aux. Craft	Whale Catcher, probable TAYFUN (converted ex-U.S. ARRIBRIS Class minesweeper)
90	URAL	Possibly COCOL
94	SARATOV	KASHIESTROI

3. Unidentified contacts in the basic report are evaluated as follows:

<u>CONTACT NO.</u>	<u>NAME</u>
29	PEKEDOVIK
55	Probably STALINGRAD
56	V. MOJOTOV
58	Possibly V. MAYAKOVSKY
65	Possibly SIBIR
80	Possibly KIEV
92	Possibly KAPSUL T-6 or PARAVAN T-8

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4. Photography obtained on this patrol is of excellent quality. Photographic coverage of ship contacts 4, 20, 24, 38, 39, 44, 47, and 90 failed to produce usable prints chiefly because of the poor light conditions under which they were taken.
5. The Commanding Officer, officers and men of USS CALIAN are congratulated for a well conducted patrol.

H. M. BRIGGS  
Ass't Chof of Staff

Copy to:  
COMSUEGRUNAVFE  
CO, USS CALIAN (SS-323)

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FF4-11:31:agh  
A16-6  
Ser 0748  
19 July 1952

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THIRD ENDORSEMENT on CO CAIMAN conf ltr SS323:A16-6 ser 022-52 of 4 Jun 1952

From: Commander Submarine Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: USS CAIMAN (SS323); report of first war patrol

Encl: (5) Photographs and identifying data, USSR ships not previously photographed by submarines

1. Forwarded. This was a well conducted shipping surveillance patrol. ComSubPac concurs with the commendatory remarks contained in first and second endorsements.
2. This patrol was characterized by thorough planning, initiative, and good judgement. Especially noteworthy was the exploitation of electronic equipment as evidenced by: (a) Tape recordings of Russian voice transmissions on 4157 kcs, (b) recording and evaluation of radio Yosami random test transmissions, (c) excellent radar performance albeit aided on occasion by "trapping" effects, and (d) good sonar performance. Report of ECM data is contained in other correspondence.
3. Although sonar performance was good and contact was made on one occasion at 23,800 yards, it is noted that sonar did not obtain contact on the KAPITAN SMIRNOV (ship contact No. 15) even though the CAIMAN, upon completion of photography, went to 100 feet and closed to a range of 800 yards while rigged for ultra quiet. Since this ship (KAPITAN SMIRNOV) was tracked on sonar by the USS POMODON (SS486) during a patrol in April 1952, it is concluded that water noise and/or temporary maloperation of sonar equipment was cause for this lack of sonar contact.
4. Radio Yosami (NDT) VLF test transmissions were heard at keel depth 105 feet during a period when NPM faded out at 70 feet. Radio Yosami has recently commenced a planned schedule of test transmissions for evaluation. ComSubPac is vitally interested in the development and use of radio Yosami and considers that this communication channel will greatly enhance submarine communications and operations in applicable areas.
5. On page 20 of basic report (vice page 19 as indicated in first endorsement) CAIMAN notes that chart HO 2124 marks a shoal spot which is not marked on chart HO 2728. The CAIMAN did not navigate in close proximity to the shoal spot as marked on HO 2124 and can not verify its actual presence.

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6. There is no information in previous patrol reports or otherwise available to ComSubPac to substantiate the note contained on page 36 of basic report concerning the possibility of the waters adjacent to KAIRO TO being restricted to navigation. It is noted that unusual radar trapping conditions existed during the time that contact 67 was made and that the range to this contact was 24 miles.
7. It is noted that on 11 May CAIMAN elected to take advantage of reduced visibility to prepare for and conduct an equalizing battery charge. Instructions contained in Chapter 62, BuShips Manual, authorize certain patrol charging procedures in lieu of an equalizing charge when operations do not permit the equalizing charge. These instructions are considered adequate.
8. The minor material deficiencies have been noted and corrective action taken. The excellent material maintenance during this patrol reflects credit upon CAIMAN's maintenance personnel and upon her preventative maintenance program.
9. Enclosures (2) and (3) have been retained in the files of ComSubPac. Paragraph 1 of basic report states that enclosure (4) was submitted under separate cover. Enclosure (5) hereto, which contains new source material for publication SIG-1, is forwarded to CinCPacFlt for retention and use in preparing future change to that publication.

L. R. DASPIT  
 Chief of Staff

Copy to:

CNO (2); CINCPACFLT (2);  
 COMNAVFE (1); COMSUBGRU WESTPAC (1);  
 COMSUBLANT (1); S/M SCHOOL N.L. (1);  
 COMSUBRON 1,3,5,7 (1 ea);  
 ALL COMSUBDIV's SUBPAC (1 ea);  
 COMSUBFLOT ONE (1);  
 ALL S/M's SUBPAC (1 ea);  
 BUSHIPS (1); HYDRO (1).

SEE OTHERS FOR REPORT  
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Authenticated:

*B. Hess*  
 B. HESS  
 Flag Secretary